

Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations

Jonathan Fox



Religion influences international politics in diverse ways. The nomination of Joseph Lieberman as the Democratic vice presidential candidate resulted in a debate over the appropriateness of an overt discussion of religious views in U.S. politics, but we cannot deny that these views exist and that they influence the decisions of policymakers, including those who make foreign policy. Clearly, the foreign policies of the leaders of theocratic states like Iran and Afghanistan are influenced by their religious views. Often their foreign policies, and occasionally their domestic policies, have provoked international issues and situations that cannot be ignored. Religious rebellions like the one in Algeria and ethnoreligious conflicts like those in Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, the Kashmir province of India, and Israel, to name just a few, all have international implications. Also, the use of religion as a source of public legitimacy is highlighted by the influence of moral appeals by religious leaders such as the pope and the Dalai Lama.

Yet, with some notable exceptions, the influence of religion has received comparatively little attention in international relations (IR).¹ Furthermore, when religion is addressed, it tends to be addressed within the context of some other category such as institutions, organizations, society, civilizations, or terrorism.² Accordingly, the purpose of this essay is twofold. First, it examines the question of why religion is often overlooked by policymakers and academics. Second, it explores how religion influences international politics.

¹David Carment and Patrick James: “The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: New Perspectives on Theory and Policy,” *Global Society* 11, No. 2 (1997), p. 207, and *Wars in the Midst of Peace* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press), pp. 2–3, 195–198. Note that international relations theory also frequently ignores other primordial factors like ethnicity, and when it does deal with such issues, it often does so inadequately.

²Vendulka Kabalkova, “Towards an International Political Theology,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), pp. 682–683.

Before we can address these questions, we should take three qualifications into account. First, I treat both the above questions within the context of current events, as opposed to the entire history of religion and international relations, because I will show that religion is relevant to international relations today. Below I discuss that there is debate over this argument.

Second, this essay refers to numerous recent events that have religious aspects but are not purely religious occurrences. I argue that there are few, if any, important political events that are purely motivated by religion. Most are motivated and influenced by complex factors, but I focus here on the religious aspects. Yet this emphasis should not be interpreted as a denial of the complex interplay among religion, politics, society, economics, and other factors.

Third, the expansiveness of the topics of religion and politics, even when limiting the discussion to those aspects most relevant to international relations, make it impossible to fully address all relevant aspects. Entire books can and have been written on many issues that are noted here only in passing. While focusing on these narrower questions, I also strive to provide detailed references that should enable the reader to explore most topics more fully.

WHY RELIGION IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Perhaps the most influential explanation of why the role of religion in international politics is overlooked is that the social sciences, including international relations, have their origin in the rejection of religion. That is, just like the scientific revolution sought rational explanations for natural phenomena to replace religious ones, early social scientists established a tradition of seeking rational explanations and guidelines for human behavior to replace theocratic ones.³ In the eighteenth century, Voltaire argued that an “age of enlightenment” would replace superstition and authoritarian religious order.⁴ Influential nineteenth-century theorists, who even today continue to shape the social sciences, including Auguste Comte, Emil Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, Max Weber, and Karl Marx, concluded that religion was a declining force in the world—one that would eventually disappear.⁵ They all believed that the old

³For a discussion of the link between science and democracy see Karen T. Liftin, “Environment, Wealth, and Authority: Global Climate Change and Emerging Modes of Legitimation,” *International Studies Review* 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 119–148.

⁴R. Scott Appleby, *Religious Fundamentalisms and Global Conflict* (New York: Foreign Policy Association Headline Series #301, 1994), pp. 7–8.

⁵Anson Shupe, “The Stubborn Persistence of Religion in the Global Arena,” in Emile Sahliyah, ed., *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 19; Brian S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, 2d ed. (London: Sage, 1990).

military/theological system was in a state of collapse and would be replaced by a modern secular system.⁶ Although the understanding of religion and society by these scholars is clearly much more complex than represented here, the idea that religion was to become a less important factor in the modern world was an essential element of this understanding.⁷

These sentiments are echoed in twentieth-century social sciences, including political science. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, political scientists believed that modernization would reduce the political significance of primordial phenomena such as ethnicity and religion.⁸ Also, the formation of IR has been attributed to the belief that the era in which religion caused war was over.⁹ These modes of thought continue to be influential even today at the beginning of the twenty-first century.¹⁰ A prime example of this is that a recent edition of *Sociology of Religion* was devoted to the debate over the influence of religion in modern society.¹¹

⁶ Ibid., pp. 134–135.

⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the views of these thinkers and others on religion and society, see *ibid.*

⁸ For examples of this literature, known as modernization theory, see Gabriel Almond, “Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Gabriel Almond and James C. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); J. Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization* (New York: John Wiley, 1972); Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1959); Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Donald E. Smith, ed., *Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World* (New York: Free Press, 1971), and *Religion and Political Modernization* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1974). For an overview of this literature, see Jonathan Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3, No. 3 (1997); Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994); and Sahliyeh, ed., *Religious Resurgence*.

⁹ Carsten B. Laustsen and Ole Waever, “In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), p. 706.

¹⁰ Barry Rubin, “Religion and International Affairs,” in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 21, argues that this mind-set also influences U.S. policymakers. Liz Fawcett, *Religion, Ethnicity, and Social Change* (New York: St. Martins, 2000), pp. 1–2, argues that Western scholarship tends to ignore religion at the expense of other issues like ethnicity. For more on modern Western views of religion, see Cecelia Lynch, “Dogma, Praxis, and Religious Perspectives on Multiculturalism,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000).

¹¹ See Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.,” *Sociology of Religion* 60, No. 3 (1999), who claims that people are as religious now as they ever were.

This debate, which reflects the ongoing discussion in sociology over the importance of religion, revolves around two related questions. The first is about the definition of “secularization,” the name given to the process of religion becoming less important in the world. Scholars argue whether secularization is defined as people becoming less religious than they have been in the past, or as a decline in the influence of religion on social and political institutions that is caused by the transformation of religion from a public issue to a private one.

Second is the disagreement over whether either of these processes is, in fact, occurring.¹² As I show in the second part of this essay, which discusses the influence of religion on international politics, the answer to these questions is relevant to the study of international relations.

The assertion that modernization will lead to the decline of religion is perhaps ironic because scholars often suggest that modernization actually has led to a resurgence of religion. There are several processes associated with modernization that have contributed to the revitalization of religion. First, attempts at modernization have been unsuccessful in much of the Third World and have undermined local traditions and community values, causing a backlash of pent-up grievances by religious movements. This also has occurred on the individual level, with those left behind by modernization feeling alienated, disoriented, and dislocated, leaving them more open to the overtures of religious movements.¹³ Scholars also often reason that it is precisely these factors that have led to the growth of fundamentalist movements around the world.¹⁴ Such movements use modern organizational, communications, and propaganda techniques. They also use modern political action techniques, including mass

¹²Ibid. For additional discussion, see other essays in the same issue.

¹³Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics*, p. 34; Mark Juergensmeyer: *The New Cold War?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), and “Terror Mandated by God,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, No. 2 (1997), p. 20; Sahliyeh, ed., *Religious Resurgence*, p. 9; and Scott M. Thomas, “Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000).

¹⁴See, for example, John L. Esposito, “Religion and Global Affairs: Political Challenges,” *SAIS Review*, Summer–Fall 1998; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Everett Mendelsohn, “Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Majid Tehranian, “Fundamentalist Impact on Education and the Media: An Overview,” in Marty and Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society*; Rhys H. Williams, “Movement Dynamics and Social Change: Transforming Fundamentalist Ideologies and Organizations,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 798–803.

mobilization and modern political institutions such as political parties and, in the case of Iran, government structures to further their fundamentalist agendas.¹⁵

Second, modernity has caused an expansion of the operating spheres of both religious movements and governments, resulting in a confrontation between the two.¹⁶ Modernity has allowed the admission of the masses, including the religious elements, into the political process.¹⁷ Also, modern communications technology has resulted in the nationalization and even globalization of diverse issues, including religion, which has forced national governments to deal with issues that previously were local.

Third, a new trend in the sociology of religion, known as the rational choice or the economic theory of religion, posits that in many modern societies the freedom of choice to select one's religion has led to an increase in religiosity (how much a person is religious). This approach applies economic market behavior theory to religious behavior, similarly to the way Mancur Olson applied it to collective action theory.¹⁸ The basic argument is that when religious monopolies are broken down, as they have been in much of the modern world, people engage in a cost-benefit analysis in selecting their religion. At the same time, religious "producers" have an incentive to make their religions as attractive as possible to the body of "consumers" in the religious "marketplace." The resulting "free market" has made religion more attractive to the "consumers" of religion, which has increased religiosity.¹⁹

A second reason that Western social scientists, especially those from the United States, often overlook religion is that from childhood most of them are socialized to believe in classical liberalism, which, among other things, advocates the separation of church and state. Future social scientists, as children studying the U.S. political system, learn that it is wrong for the government to endorse any religion, and it is right for it to avoid all unnecessary interference

¹⁵S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities,'" *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), pp. 601-603.

¹⁶Shupe, "The Stubborn Persistence," pp. 20-24.

¹⁷Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," pp. 22-23; Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas," pp. 602-603.

¹⁸Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). For an analysis and criticism of Olson's rational actor theory, see James B. Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

¹⁹Laurence R. Iannaccone: "Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34, No. 1 (1995), and "Second Thoughts: A Response to Chaves, Demerath, and Ellison," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34, No. 1 (1995); R. Stephen Warner, "Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 98, No. 5 (1993).

with religion. While a full discussion of the influence of this socialization on the worldviews of social scientists is beyond the scope of this essay, it is likely that this socialization will cause social scientists to overlook religion as an important factor in the study of international politics. Similarly, other modern ideologies that have been the basis for socialization in much of the world, such as Marxism, also contain biases against religion.²⁰

A final reason why some social scientists fail to include religion in their explanations of international phenomena applies to quantitative studies. Those who engage in quantitative studies often are accused of ignoring variables that are hard to measure. Religion is perhaps one of the hardest variables to measure. This is true for two reasons. First, the lack of attention that scholars give to the topic provides a poor basis on which to develop variables. That is, most of the theories and variables that have been quantified are based on an extensive qualitative literature on the relevant topic. Thus, the scarcity of international relations literature on religion probably has hampered efforts to conceptualize how it may be measured. Second, it is clear that the only truly accurate measure would involve reading the minds of political actors to discover their true motivations. Since this is not currently possible, researchers using quantitative methods probably choose not to measure religion at all.

In the rare instances when religion is included, the measures are generally relatively crude. Some studies simply measure the number of religions involved in a conflict or whether the groups involved in a dyadic conflict are of different religions. Errol Henderson measures whether two states involved in an international conflict have populations that adhere to different religions,²¹ and Rudolph Rummel, while examining domestic conflict, similarly measures the number of different religions present in a state.²² Some studies measure specific aspects of the influence of religion that are informative but also limited.

In a series of studies on ethnic conflict, I developed several variables, including measures for religious legitimacy, religious discrimination, and religious institutions.²³ Perhaps the most sophisticated general measure of religion's influ-

²⁰Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 37–40, argues that this attitude also has influenced many policymakers.

²¹Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1882–1989," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, No. 5 (1997).

²²Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, No. 2 (1997).

²³Jonathan Fox: "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22, No. 2 (1999), and "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 20, No. 2 (2000).

ence on conflict assesses whether religious issues are more important compared to political, economic, cultural, and autonomy issues, and it is based on the extent of discrimination and grievances expressed over that discrimination.²⁴ Yet this measure is still of the “more than” or “less than” variety, as opposed to a more accurate scale. Also, the measure I developed for religious legitimacy turned out to be less accurate than a simple measure of whether or not a state has an official religion.²⁵ Although all of these indicators succeed at measuring some aspects of the influence of religion on political behavior, they are all relatively crude variables. Just because a perfect measurement of religion’s influence on political behavior is probably not an achievable goal, it does not mean that improved measures are not possible and desirable.²⁶

THE INFLUENCES OF RELIGION ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Religion influences international politics in three ways. First, foreign policies are influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy for both supporting and criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. Third, many local religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across borders or otherwise become international issues.

Religion as an Influence on Decisionmaking

The assertion that religion can influence our views is not new or in dispute. Religion is often part of people’s worldviews and influences their perception of events and their actions. While it is clear that some or even many individuals today do not give much weight to religion, it is indisputable that there are those who do and that at least some policymakers fall into this category.

Most scholars who discuss the influence of religion on human beings argue that it somehow influences how we think. Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge note that sociologists of religion assume that “people almost universally possess a coherent, overarching, and articulated ‘Weltanschauung,’ ‘world view,’

²⁴Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues.”

²⁵Fox, “The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-religious Minorities,” *Journal of Peace Research* 36, No. 3 (1999).

²⁶For a comprehensive discussion of the schemes I used to measure the influence of religion on ethnic conflict and the reasoning behind it, see Jonathan Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict,” *Nations and Nationalism* 5, No. 4 (1999). For an overview of the results of this research program, see Jonathan Fox, “The Ethnic-Religious Nexus: The Impact of Religion on Ethnic Conflict,” *Civil Wars* 3, No. 3 (2000).

‘perspective,’ ‘frame of reference,’ ‘value orientation,’ or ‘meaning system’” that is often based on religion.²⁷ Melford Spiro states that “every religious system consists . . . of a cognitive system.”²⁸ Williams discusses fundamentalist social movements and describes their belief systems as “frames” that are the “schemata of interpretation,” which people use to “give meaning to events, organize experiences, and provide guides for actions.”²⁹ Clifford Geertz deduces that not only do religions include a belief system, but most people also find religion necessary to interpret the world around them, especially when bad things happen.³⁰ Even some of those social scientists who inspired the trend of replacing religion with rationalism acknowledge that religion influences beliefs. Durkheim defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”³¹ Weber also strongly connected religion with beliefs.³² Finally, Marx’s famous description of religion as the “opiate of the masses” acknowledges its influence on beliefs and behavior.³³

Several survey-based studies also find that religious affiliation influences political attitudes and behavior. Among these findings: those who are reli-

²⁷Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 366.

²⁸Melford E. Spiro, “Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation,” in Michael Banton, ed., *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), p. 94.

²⁹Williams, “Movement Dynamics and Social Change,” pp. 790–791.

³⁰Clifford Geertz: “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Banton, ed., *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, and *The Interpretation of Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

³¹Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, translated by Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 47. For a more detailed discussion of Durkheim’s views on religion, see W.S.F. Pickering: *Durkheim on Religion: A selection of Readings with Bibliographies* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), and *Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).

³²Stephen Kalberg, “The Rationalization of Action in Max Weber’s Sociology of Religion,” *Sociological Theory* 8, No. 1 (1990), p. 61; John Hickey, *Religion and the Northern Ireland Problem* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1984), p. 62; Peer Scheepers and Frans Van Der Silk, “Religion and Attitudes on Moral Issues: Effects of Individual, Spouse and Parental Characteristics,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37, No. 4 (1998), p. 679.

³³For a more detailed discussion of the views of Marx and Weber (among others) on religion and society, see Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*.

giously affiliated tend to be more politically conservative than those who are not;³⁴ Christians and Jews group political issues into categories differently;³⁵ in general, religiosity is inversely related to domestic violence, but men who have more conservative religious views than their partners are more likely to engage in domestic violence;³⁶ the nature of one's religiosity is linked to one's propensity toward conflict;³⁷ religiosity and authoritarianism are linked;³⁸ religious fundamentalism is linked with prejudice against blacks, women, homosexuals, and communists;³⁹ attitudes of Americans toward religious fundamentalists influence their decision to vote Democratic or Republican;⁴⁰ and religious denomination, when controlling for factors like education and income, is a strong predictor of moral attitudes.⁴¹

There are two potential ways in which religious belief systems can influence international politics. The first is that these belief systems can influence the outlook and behavior of policymakers. Weber describes how this happens through a concept called psychological premiums. He argues that religions place psychological premiums on actions that serve as filters for evaluating how one

³⁴Bernadette C. Hayes, "The Impact of Religious Identification on Political Attitudes: An International Comparison," *Sociology of Religion* 56, No. 2 (1995).

³⁵Alan S. Miller, "The Influence of Religious Affiliation on the Clustering of Social Attitudes," *Review of Religious Research* 37, No. 3 (1996).

³⁶Christopher G. Ellison, John P. Bartkowski, and Kristin L. Anderson, "Are There Religious Variations in Domestic Violence?" *Journal of Family Issues* 20, No. 1 (1999).

³⁷Michael E. Nielson and Jim Fultz, "Further Examination of the Relationships of Religious Orientation to Religious Conflict," *Review of Religious Research* 36, No. 4 (1995).

³⁸Gary K. Leak and Brandy A. Randall, "Clarification of the Link between Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Religiousness: The Role of Religious Maturity," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34, No. 2 (1995).

³⁹Lee A. Kirkpatrick, "Fundamentalism, Christian Orthodoxy, and Intrinsic Religious Orientation as Predictors of Discriminatory Attitudes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32, No. 3 (1993).

⁴⁰Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, "The Anti-Christian Fundamentalist Factor in Contemporary Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63 (1999).

⁴¹Helen R.F. Ebaugh and Allen Haney, "Church Attendance and Attitudes toward Abortion: Differentials in Liberal and Conservative Churches," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 17 (1978); Ted G. Jelen, "Respect for Life, Sexual Morality, and Opposition to Abortion," *Review of Religious Research* 25 (1984); Richard Harris and Edgar W. Mills, "Religion, Values, and Attitudes toward Abortion," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 24 (1985); Scheepers and Van Der Silk, "Religion and Attitudes on Moral Issues"; Eric Woodrum, "Determinants of Moral Attitudes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27 (1988).

should behave.⁴² Richard Wentz maintains that these belief systems are so essential to our thought processes that we will not only ignore any information that challenges them, but we also will defend our belief systems from outside challenges at all costs.⁴³ Carsten Laustsen and Ole Waever similarly argue that these belief systems result in particularly extreme and intractable responses because “religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one cannot be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being.”⁴⁴ David Carment and Patrick James note that such threats to basic values are among the causes of ethnic conflicts.⁴⁵

Religiously inspired views held by policymakers and the policies based upon them could result in nearly intractable policies, which can lead to international incidents, including war. In an empirical example of this phenomenon, Deepa Khosla demonstrates that religious sects are more likely to draw international intervention on their behalf than any other type of ethnic group.⁴⁶ Similarly, Henderson finds that religious differences are among the causes of international wars.⁴⁷

Another excellent example of the influence of religious worldviews on policy is the Arab–Israeli conflict in its many manifestations during the past century. Both sides of the conflict have made exclusive claims to the same territory, based at least partly on religion. This dispute has led to several major wars that have involved superpowers and a series of terrorist attacks and violent uprisings. The conflict also has resulted in a “peace process,” which has involved the United States and other major powers, the United Nations, and various states in the region.

Even if the peace process is eventually successful and results in a settlement, it is probable that there will be religious-based opposition on both sides. While some observers note that both sides have often relied on secular ideologies to guide them, the religious claims of both sides cannot be denied. The recent troubles that resulted after Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s visit in

⁴² Kalberg, “The Rationalization of Action,” pp. 63–66. For a more detailed discussion of the views of Weber on religion and society see Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, and David Latin, “Religion, Political Culture, and the Weberian Tradition,” *World Politics* 30, No. 4 (1978).

⁴³ Richard Wentz, *Why People Do Bad Things in the Name of Religion* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer, 1987).

⁴⁴ Laustsen and Waever, “In Defense of Religion,” p. 719.

⁴⁵ David Carment and Patrick James, “Escalation of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Politics* 35 (1998), p. 68.

⁴⁶ Deepa Khosla, “Third World States as Interveners in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security,” *Third World Quarterly* 20, No. 6 (1999), p. 1152.

⁴⁷ Henderson, “Culture or Contiguity.”

September 2000 to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a site considered holy by both Jews and Muslims, are a case in point. Furthermore, scholars like Anthony Smith trace the origins of secular ideologies like nationalism to religion.⁴⁸ It is also telling that many, if not most, of those on both sides who object to the Arab–Israeli peace process are members of the religious nationalist camps.

This example also brings to light the second way religion can directly influence the decisions of policymakers via constraints placed on policymakers by widely held beliefs within the population they represent. That is, even in autocratic governments, policymakers would be unwise to make a decision that runs directly counter to some belief, moral, or value that is widely and deeply held by their constituents. Thus both Israeli and Arab leaders have had to weigh very carefully what their populations would accept when making agreements. In another example of this phenomenon, while purely realist concerns dictated that Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt would side with the United States in its military opposition to Iraq during the Gulf War, religious concerns made the decision more complicated. There was much opposition in the Arab world to an Islamic state siding with a non-Islamic state against another Islamic state. There was also considerable opposition to allowing a non-Muslim army on what was considered to be holy Islamic territory.

Not only do religious-based attitudes among constituents on specific issues constrain policymakers, but religion also influences the political and cultural mediums in which they act. Several studies have found that states with Islamic populations are disproportionately autocratic.⁴⁹ Other than the specific studies

⁴⁸ Anthony D. Smith: “Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of Nationalist Ideals,” *Nations and Nationalism* 5, No. 3 (1999), and “The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000); David M. Green, “The End of Identity? The Implications of Postmodernity for Political Identification,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, No. 3 (2000), p. 71. For a comparison of religion and nationalism, see Jonathan Fox and Josephine Squires, “Threats to Primal Identities: A Comparison of Nationalism and Religion as It Impacts on Protest and Rebellion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, No. 1 (2000); Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,” *World Politics* 52 (2000). Also see Andreas Osiander, “Religion and Politics in Western Civilization: The Ancient World as Matrix and Mirror of the Modern,” *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), who traces modern political concepts like totalitarianism and ethnic cleansing to religious origins.

⁴⁹ I used only one measure of democracy in “Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 1–23, but Manus I. Midlarsky, “Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42, No. 3 (1998), used three and found Islam to be correlated with autocracy as measured by two of them. It is important to note that this view is contested. Daniel E. Price, *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), found that Islam neither undermines nor supports democracy and/or human rights.

on this topic, few quantitative studies of religion's influence on political structures exist. Nevertheless, it is clear that the connection between Islam and autocracy is only the tip of the iceberg.

Samuel Huntington assumes this when he states that international conflict in the post-Cold War era will be between civilizations that are based mostly on religion.⁵⁰ In part, he is making the argument that religion is linked to issues of identity, another strong influence on international politics.⁵¹

The civilizations Huntington describes tend to be religiously homogeneous. He defines the Sinic/Confucian civilization as the Confucian Chinese, Chinese minorities outside of China, and "the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea." The Japanese civilization appears to include the Japanese and only the Japanese. The Hindu and Islamic civilizations appear to be wholly defined by religion, even if Huntington claims otherwise. The Slavic-Orthodox civilization seems to be a combination of the Orthodox Christian religion and a common historical experience. The Western civilization is basically the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, which are mostly Protestant Christians but include some Catholics. The Latin American is distinguished by being Catholic and "incorporates indigenous cultures." Finally, the "possible" African civilization is based on a developing common identity. Other scholars counter that Huntington's concept of civilizations is highly correlated with religion.⁵²

Critics may disagree with the bulk of Huntington's assumptions, but they generally do not oppose his argument that identity is an important influence on politics. Rather, they question whether post-Cold War identities will be civilizational. Some posit that the relevant level of identity will be national or even subnational.⁵³ Others contend that the world is unifying into a single

⁵⁰ See Samuel P. Huntington: "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3 (1993); *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and "The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 6 (1996).

⁵¹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 47, admits his definitions are largely based on religion.

⁵² These include Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas," p. 591; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue," *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), p. 616; Laustsen and Waever, "In Defense of Religion," p. 705; A. Smith, "The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism," p. 791; and Bassam Tibi, "Post-Bipolar Disorder in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam," *Millennium* 29, No. 3 (2000), p. 844.

⁵³ See, for example, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick et al., "The Modernizing Imperative," *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 4 (1993); Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Shirleen T. Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger; with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1998);

identity.⁵⁴ The vigorous nature of this debate underscores the influence that scholars frequently believe identity, including religious identity, has on political behavior.⁵⁵ This is particularly important since many believe religion to be one of the most important influences on identity.⁵⁶

The debates described above among sociologists on whether people are becoming less religious and whether the influence of religion over social and political institutions is declining are pertinent to the study of international politics. If people are becoming less religious, this would mean that religion would be less of an influence on policymakers because policymakers themselves would be, on average, less religious and because a less religious population would mean weakened religious constraints on policy options. These constraints also would weaken if religion, in fact, is moving from the public to the private sphere.

Yet other scholars hold that even if religion is moving to the private sphere, it continues to influence policy because many modern ideologies that influence policymaking have religious origins, including nationalism. Such influence is often indirect but nonetheless important.

Religion and Legitimacy

Like the argument that religion influences beliefs and behavior, the argument that religion is a source of legitimacy is not a new one. Religion may be used to

Zerougui A. Kader, review of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20, No. 1 (1998); and Richard Rosecrance, review of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, *American Political Science Review* 92, No. 4 (1998).

⁵⁴See, for example, Said Tariq Anwar, "Civilizations versus Civilizations in a New Multipolar World," *Journal of Marketing*, 62, No. 2 (1998); G. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest" *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 2 (1997); and Frederick S. Tipson, "Culture Clash-ification: A Verse to Huntington's Curse," *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 2 (1997).

⁵⁵For a more comprehensive discussion of this debate, see Jonathan Fox: "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis," *British Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming); "Islam and the West: The Influence of Two Civilizations on Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, No. 4 (July 2001), pp. 459–472; and "Civilizational, Religious, and National Explanations for Ethnic Rebellion in the Post-Cold War Middle East," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 13, Nos. 1–2 (Spring 2001).

⁵⁶Laustsen and Waever, "In Defense of Religion," p. 709; Jonathan Fox, "Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," *International Politics* 38, No. 4 (2001).

legitimate governments as well as those who oppose them.⁵⁷ Some scholars insist that the legitimacy of governments cannot be fully separated from religion.⁵⁸ Yet others counter that religion, like any other factor, is likely to add to a state's or opposition movement's legitimacy only to the extent that it is perceived as an acceptable and capable means of resolving those issues that divide society.⁵⁹

While the above examples refer to domestic politics, the arguments are also applicable to international politics. Like domestic policy behavior, foreign policy can be legitimated by religion. In an extreme example, calls for war can be justified as holy war. Although this is currently associated most often with Islamic governments and terrorist movements, it is not unique to them. In less extreme examples, humanitarian intervention can be justified as the moral thing to do. Furthermore, the modern concept of *just war* has its origins in theological justifications for war.⁶⁰

Another indicator of the legitimacy of religion in international relations is the attention given to religious leaders by policymakers and the media. Pope John Paul II's recent apology for the role of Catholics (as opposed to the Catholic Church itself) in the Holocaust highlights the feeling of many Jews that if Pope John Paul II's predecessor had openly opposed the activities of the Nazis in World War II, it would have forced the Nazis to cut back on their persecution of Jews. That the most well-known leaders of persecuted minorities, opposition movements, and independence movements are often religious figures also indicates the legitimacy of religion internationally. Such past and current leaders include Mahatma Gandhi in India, the Dalai Lama in Tibet, Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa, and numerous members of the Catholic clergy in Latin America, to name just a few.

⁵⁷ Anthony Gill, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Hank Johnston and Jozef Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27, No. 1 (1988), pp. 32–34; Gunther Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (New York: Oxford, 1974), pp. 550–551.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power," in J. Ben-David and C. Nichols Clark, eds., *Culture and Its Creators* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977), pp. 267–268; Nikos Kokosalakis, "Legitimation, Power and Religion in Modern Society," *Sociological Analysis* 46, No. 4 (1985), p. 371; Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, pp. 178–198.

⁵⁹ Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963). For a more complete discussion of the literature on religion and legitimacy, see Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy."

⁶⁰ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

The dispute between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, over the designation of Tibet's second most important religious figure, the Panchen Lama, highlights the importance of local and international religious legitimacy. The Dalai Lama's opposition to the Chinese rule of Tibet is well known. Yet the most recent Panchen Lama, who died in 1989, supported the Chinese government. Buddhists believe in the transmigration of souls from life to life, so that major religious figures, including the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, are reincarnated after their deaths. The naming of the new Panchen Lama has considerable implications for the control of religious legitimacy in the conflict over Tibet. Also, the new incarnation of the Panchen Lama will play a part in determining the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama.

In 1995, the Dalai Lama determined that Gehun Choekyi Nyima, then a six-year-old boy, was the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The Chinese government opposed this decision, detained Gehun Choekyi Nyima, and enthroned a different six-year-old boy, Gyaincain Tashi Lhunpo, as the tenth reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama's choice is presumably still under detention by the Chinese government.

Although the literature on international relations rarely addresses religious legitimacy, there has been a growing discussion of the role of normative power in international relations. Many advocates reason that being perceived as morally correct is becoming a source of influence on the international stage.⁶¹ Yet few would dispute that religion is a potential source of this kind of normative power.

Religion as an International Issue

While it is not clear that religion was ever solely a domestic issue, it is currently an issue that crosses borders and accordingly is an international issue. There are several ways in which religious issues currently cross borders. Although they are presented here as distinct categories, there is much overlap among them.

First, local religious and ethnoreligious conflicts often reach international dimensions. There are numerous ways these conflicts can spread across borders. In cases of ethnoreligious conflict, the populations involved often have diasporas or established populations living in other states. These populations either will support the rebelling minority or also can be inspired to rebel.

⁶¹See, for example, Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review* 2, No. 1 (2000); Hendrik Spruyt, "The End of Empire and the Extension of the Westphalian System: The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order," *International Studies Review* 2, No. 1 (2000); Franke Wilmer, *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993).

A specific example is the rebellion by the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo against the Serbian government. The violence in Kosovo recently spread to the sizable Albanian minority in bordering Macedonia. Also, there was much support for the ethnic Albanians from Albania, as well as from numerous Islamic states and organizations. Similarly, the rebellion by Muslims in the Kashmir province of India has contributed to sporadic military conflict with neighboring Pakistan, which is religiously and ethnically similar to the population in the province. The international ramifications of this dispute are even greater now that both Pakistan and India are nuclear powers.

Another potentially important instance of religious conflict crossing borders is the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. Particularly when the war was between the militant Islamic rebels and the Soviet-supported government, a small number of Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to fight with the Islamic rebels. Many of these people have since returned home, bringing with them their militant ideologies and, more important, their training and experience in guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Ted Gurr calls this process of conflicts spreading across borders through demonstration and spillover effects contagion and diffusion.⁶² Contagion, the spillover of conflict across borders, also can cross religious and ethnic lines, thereby contributing to the destabilization of a region. Some religious and ethno-religious conflicts have become so destabilizing that they have drawn international military intervention, as occurred in Kosovo, and/or have required international peacekeepers in their aftermath, as occurred in East Timor.

Diffusion explains how a rebellion in one place can inspire similar groups living elsewhere to do the same. Although Gurr's research focuses on ethnic conflict, these processes are applicable to religious conflict. The successful rebellion in Iran is credited with inspiring Islamic opposition movements throughout the globe.

A second way religious issues are crossing borders is the growing strength of fundamentalist movements worldwide. Marty and Appleby's groundbreaking fundamentalism project shows that, if nothing else, religious fundamentalism is present in most religions and in most regions of the world.⁶³ These movements often seek to break the barrier between religion and the state where such barriers exist, as well as to export their movements elsewhere. While the efforts to make governments more religious may seem like a local issue, they

⁶²Ted R. Gurr: *Minorities at Risk* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); "Why Minorities Rebel," *International Political Science Review* 14, No. 2 (1993); and *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

⁶³Marty and Appleby, eds.: *Fundamentalisms and the State, Fundamentalisms and Society, and Accounting for Fundamentalisms*.

are not in the long term. This is because successful efforts to transform governments can change not only domestic policies, but also foreign policies.

These religiously inspired or influenced foreign policies are a third way religious issues can cross borders. Extreme examples include Iran and Afghanistan. Iran's support of militant Islamic groups, especially in Lebanon, and suspected support of terrorist cells in the West is clearly an international issue. Similarly, Afghanistan's sheltering of Osama Bin Laden, who is suspected of masterminding several terrorist attacks against the United States, and its destruction of the country's giant Buddha statues are also international issues.

A fourth way in which religion gains international attention results from the linkage of human rights issues and religious rights. The U.S. Department of State recently has started issuing annual religious rights reports, although it has included a section on religious rights in its annual human rights report dating back to the 1970s.⁶⁴ Religious rights are also enshrined in international documents. Article 18 in the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 states that religious differences should be respected. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 prohibits religious discrimination and inciting hatred due to religion. It also protects the rights of religious minorities from restrictions on their culture. The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief of 1981 provides more specific religious rights. The declaration includes the rights to worship, assemble, and maintain places for these purposes; to establish charitable and humanitarian institutions; to make and/or acquire suitable materials for religious rites; to write, publish, and disseminate; to teach; to solicit voluntary contributions; to train and/or elect religious leaders; to observe days of rest and holy days; and to have access to national and international communication on religious matters.⁶⁵ While it is clear that these rights are not respected in

⁶⁴Copies of these reports are available at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/. While some may argue the new religious rights reports are due to the influence of the religious right on U.S. politics, it is important to note that both the human rights and religious rights reports were instituted during Democratic administrations. Even if this is true, it still is a manifestation of domestic religious beliefs that influence U.S. foreign policy behavior, which with American superpower status means the issue crosses borders.

⁶⁵For a more detailed discussion of religious rights, see Derek H. Davis, "Thoughts on Religious Persecution around the Globe: Problems and Solutions," *Journal of Church and State* 40, No. 2 (1998); Yoram Dinstein, "Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities," *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* 20 (1991); W. Cole Durham, Jr., "Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework," in John D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); David Little, "Studying 'Religious Human Right': Methodological Foundations," in *ibid.*

many parts of the world, their violation is drawing increasing international attention. It is possible that this attention can lead to intervention if there is a change in the international regime, which dictates what types of state behavior justify intervention.⁶⁶

A fifth way looks at several international issues that overlap with local religious views. Since women's rights have become increasingly important, there has been increased attention to the status of women in those states where a woman's role is dictated by religious precepts rather than concepts of gender equality. Another clash between religious values and international imperatives is the issue of world population control, which conflicts with some religious restrictions on birth control.

A sixth way is recognizing that the world is becoming more interdependent. In a world where states must interact economically to survive, local issues and problems can easily spread across borders or at least be more likely to receive international attention. This is especially true since communications technology, including the Internet and news networks like CNN, allows ideas, including religious ones, to transcend borders more easily.

Finally, while it is not strictly a way that religion crosses borders, no discussion of the international implications of religion would be complete without addressing political Islam. Huntington's claim that Islam is a serious potential threat to the West and one of the greatest sources of violence is clearly debatable.⁶⁷ Critics note that Islam is not the threat people often believe it to be.⁶⁸ Conflicts within Islam occur more often than conflicts between Islam and other civilizations.⁶⁹ Moreover, the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism is waning,⁷⁰ while many Islamic fundamentalists advocate peaceful dialogue and understanding rather than violence as the preferred method for dealing with non-

⁶⁶For a more thorough discussion of the influence of religion on foreign intervention, see Fox, "Religious Causes of International Intervention."

⁶⁷Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*. For more on Islam as a threat to the West, see Tibi, "Post-Bipolar Disorder."

⁶⁸Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995); John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, 2d ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

⁶⁹Kader, "The Clash of Civilizations"; Halliday, *Nation and Religion*; Mahmood Monshipouri, "The West's Modern Encounter with Islam: From Discourse to Reality," *Journal of Church and State* 40, No. 1 (1998).

⁷⁰Hunter, *The Future of Islam*.

Muslims.⁷¹ Whether Huntington or his critics are correct will continued to be debated. Significantly, policymakers who tend to believe Huntington's predictions are more disposed to perceive religious Muslims as enemies than as friends. As a result, this fear of the spread of Islam, whether it is based in fact or not, has the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy that may either cause or exacerbate the spread of conflicts involving political Islam across borders.⁷²

CONCLUSIONS

While the above discussion divides the influence of religion on international politics into three distinct categories, reality is more complicated. These categories often overlap. Many scholars attest that in much of the Third World, the failure of secular governments—guided by secular ideologies—has led to a legitimacy crisis that has facilitated or even enhanced the ability of religious movements to oppose them. This legitimacy crisis has resulted in opposition movements and violent conflicts, such as the one in Algeria, which have drawn considerable international attention. One of the earliest of these opposition movements was successful in Iran, resulting in a theocratic state governed by leaders with overtly religious worldviews.⁷³

The examples of Iran and Algeria may be considered worst case scenarios, but they are not easily dismissed exceptions to a generally secular international order. They are extreme cases of more common trends. Religious opposition movements and/or interest groups, which seek to either replace or influence government policy, exist throughout the world. Gurr's study of ethnic conflict lists 101 politically active ethnic minorities that are of different religions than the dominant populations in their states and an additional 32 that are different

⁷¹ Esposito and Voll, "Islam and the West"; Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics*, pp. 67–70; and George Weigel, "Religion and Peace: An Argument Complexified," in Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub, eds., *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), pp. 185–187.

⁷² Scholars who discuss Huntington's self-fulfilling prophecies include Pierre Hassner, "Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous," *The National Interest* 46 (1997); William Pfaff, "The Reality of Human Affairs," *World Policy Journal* 14, No. 2 (1997); Liu Singhua, "History as Antagonism," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 160, No. 18 (1997); Tony Smith, "Dangerous Conjecture," *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 2 (1997); and Tipson, "Culture Clash-ification."

⁷³ See, for example, Haynes, *Religion in Third World Politics*; Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*; Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State," *Comparative Politics* 27, No. 4 (1995); Sahliyeh, ed., *Religious Resurgence*.

denominations of the same religion.⁷⁴ Many policymakers are religious, and it is likely that their religious beliefs influence their actions. Whether they truly believe or not, they often find it useful to draw upon religion to justify their actions, which indicates that religion is a source of legitimacy on the international stage.

Furthermore, religion is often tied to other issues that distinctly influence international politics. This discussion has noted the links between religion and nationalism, totalitarianism, modernization, the origins of the Westphalian state system, political regimes, political opinions and attitudes, ethnicity, ethnic cleansing, issues of identity, women's rights, population growth, and the origins of the social sciences. Other issues with international implications that have been linked elsewhere to religion include the politics of specific states,⁷⁵ the process of globalization,⁷⁶ conflict management,⁷⁷ terrorism,⁷⁸ political culture,⁷⁹ environmentalism,⁸⁰ personal wealth,⁸¹ and attitudes toward war and peace.⁸²

⁷⁴Gurr, *Peoples versus States*.

⁷⁵A notable example of this is Israel. See Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics in Israel* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Shmuel Sandler, "Religious Zionism and the State: Political Accommodation and Religious Radicalism in Israel," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar, eds., *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

⁷⁶Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994).

⁷⁷Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Conflict Management of Religious Issues: The Israeli Case in Comparative Perspective," in Reuven Y. Hazan and Moshe Maor, eds., *Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon*.

⁷⁸Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18 (1995); Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," *Journal of International Affairs* 50, No. 1 (1996); David C. Rapoport: "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984); and "Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

⁷⁹Latin, "Religion, Political Culture and the Weberian Tradition."

⁸⁰Bron Taylor, "Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, No. 4 (1998).

⁸¹Ayla Hammond Schbley, "Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 23 (2000).

⁸²Weigel, "Religion and Peace."

Despite this, the role religion plays in international relations is often overlooked. Perhaps the strongest indicator of this role is that most of the references in this essay are drawn either from studies of topics other than international relations or from works that do not directly address religion. While it is true that many case studies of individual international events do address religion, it is clear that the more aggregate and theoretical studies, which contribute to and develop the paradigms we use to understand international politics, tend to omit religion from the equation. This omission of such an important factor that influences international politics in so many ways and on so many levels is detrimental to the profession and should be addressed.