WHOSE DEVELOPMENT, WHICH RATIONALITY: GAUDIUM ET SPES, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AFTER MACINTYRE

Scott M. Thomas
Institute for International Policy Analysis
S.M.Thomas@bath.ac.uk

"[John] Kerry's statement during the third [presidential] debate that he couldn't impose his religious views on people sounded good until you thought about it for a few seconds: so he's willing to impose policy positions if he arrived at them though secularly-driven reasons but not if his rationale came from faith? The implication is that you could be against the war [in Iraq] if your moral reasons came from watching [Michael Moore's film] *Fahrenheit 9/11* but not if your moral reasons came from Catholic teaching."

- Steven Waldman, "Democratic Faith Delusions," beliefnet.com,
November 7, 2004.

"What is to be done to prevent increased exchange between cultures (which ought to lead to genuine and fruitful dialogue between groups and nations) from disturbing the life of communities, overthrowing traditional wisdom and endangering the character of people? How is the dynamism and expansion of the new [universal] culture to be fostered without losing living fidelity to the heritage of tradition?" (GS, 56).

"The differences of culture and value systems …. Render the social question much more complex, precisely because this question has assumed a universal dimension (SS, 14).

This paper examines how Alasdair MacIntyre's social theory can help the Church to more clearly and effectively articulate its concept of integral or authentic human development given the global resurgence of religion taking place in world politics, and the changing discourse among policy makers and development practitioners on the meaning of development. It also examines how his social theory can help the Church to better connect the main concerns of Catholic social teaching to some of the key policy issues in international development today. At the same time, MacIntyre's social theory can help the Church to see some of the ways in which aspects of GS reflected the heyday of modernization theory and liberal modernity that dominated development policy in the 1960s (see the abbreviations of the papal encyclicals at the end of the paper).

However, before we examine how MacIntyre's social theory is relevant to Catholic social teaching on international development we have to understand the global resurgence of religion taking place in world politics. We also have to see why taking cultural and religious pluralism seriously is now one of the most important changing circumstances in international relations in which the Pastoral Constitution of the Church is to be interpreted.

The Changing Signs of the Times: the Twentieth Century as the "Last Modern Century"

September 11 did more than kill thousands of civilians, demolish the World Trade Center, and damage the Pentagon. It dramatically destroyed the West's ruling or governing myth - at times, reflected in the optimistic conception of modernity in some of the documents of Vatican II, that modernity is a single condition and the global home of all of us. As societies become more modern, they become more like the West, realizing our values, i.e. the values of the Western Enlightenment.[1]

In fact, to coin a phrase from Johan Huizinga, the waning of the modern age has been taking place for quite some time, and we may well remember the twentieth century as "the last modern century."[2] History did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism as Francis Fukuyama once predicted. It is more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, and to use David Tracy's apt words, we are still having difficulty in naming the present – are we living in the post-Cold War era, or do we name the present in other ways, as the global era, the age of globalization, or as the era of global terrorism?[3]

Since GS and the Second Vatican Council one of the most significant changing signs of the times is a global resurgence of religion taking place throughout the world, which is more wide ranging than a clash of civilizations driven by religious extremism, terrorism, or fundamentalism. In the developed countries the global resurgence of religion is part of a larger existential crisis, reflecting a deep and widespread disillusionment with a "modernity" that reduces the world to what can be perceived and controlled through reason, science, technology, and bureaucratic rationality, and leaves out considerations of religion, the spiritual, or the sacred.

The "naive mechanistic optimism," of the 1950s and 1960s, "has been replaced by a well-founded anxiety for the fate of humanity" (SS, 27). In so far as postmodernism shows a greater sensitivity to the human limits of the Weberian disenchantment of the world, it shares a basic insight with those theologians, cultural critics, artists, or even the activists in the new social movements, who recognize the limits of this disenchantment though their concerns about the rat race, capitalism, the consumer society, materialism, the environment, and the commodification of every day life by the global economy, even though they may not recognize them as religious or spiritual concerns (LG, 16; RH, 18, 46).[4]

In developing countries the global resurgence of religion is the result of the failure of the secular modernizing state to produce democracy or development, and the widespread inequalities in wealth brought by the neo-liberal prescription of free markets and open economies. Because of this situation a growing conflict between religious nationalism and secular nationalism was one of the most important developments in the politics of developing countries in the 1990s.[5] This global cultural and religious shift is challenging our interpretation of the modern world - what it means to be modern, as a variety of social and religious groups struggle to find alternative paths to modernity. The post-modern world is turning out to be a post-secular world as well.

Therefore, since the Second Vatican Council, "one of the most serious problems of our time" is no longer atheism nor secularism, but the problem of cultural and religious pluralism (GS, 19-21, 28). What GS prophetically called for at the time, the "proper development of culture," has now become a key aspect of the struggle for authenticity and

development taking place in the developing world as part of the global resurgence of religion (GS, 53-62).

> "[H]ow are we to acknowledge as lawful the claims of autonomy, which culture makes for itself, without falling into a humanism which is purely earthbound and even hostile to religion? ....[H]uman culture must evolve today in such a way that it will develop the whole human person harmoniously and integrally, and will help all [people] to fulfil the tasks to which they are called" (GS, 56).

The questions that GS asked regarding the proper development of culture are not only related to authenticity and development. They also now have a grave impact on global security, the war on global terrorism, and international development. We have seen for some time now the Western culture of modernity and the institutions of international society have been challenged by the global resurgence of religion and cultural pluralism in international relations.[6] Taking cultural and religious pluralism seriously is now recognized as a key global issue by the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Western donor governments, and the United Nations Development Program.[7]

A second important change since the Second Vatican Council has been globalization. Globalization refers to a set of technological processes affecting the world economy, telecommunications, information technology, travel, and growing economic interdependence between states and peoples that is altering our sense of time and space, and is creating, or is at least creating the possibility, the world will become a single social space.[8]

Globalization, it is argued, has created a "shrinking world," and so the metaphors abound - spaceship earth, our global neighborhood, global society, global civil society, and global international society. It is argued globalization is rapidly dissolving the social and economic barriers between states, transforming the world's diverse populations into a uniform global market, and at the same time ethnic, religious, and racial hatreds are fragmenting the political landscape into smaller and smaller tribal units. Thus, according to some theorists of globalization, the global resurgence of culture and religion is coming about in response to the paradoxical interdependence of these social forces. Globalization is creating a more *unified* and a more *fragmented* or pluralistic world at the same time.[9]

The Second Vatican Council seemed to anticipate the unifying elements of economic interdependence, what we now call globalization, and the coming of a common or universal form of culture (GS, 54, 61; NA, 1). However, it also warned, given the Catholic social principles of personalism and subsidiarity, about the danger of fragmentation, that as the unity of humankind is being fostered, it should be expressed in ways "that the particular characteristics of each culture are preserved" (GS, 54).

In fact, globalization may not mean the world is being swept up by the unrelenting and unstoppable homogenizing forces of a blandly uniform globalization. What is taking place has more accurately, if awkwardly, been described by Roland Robertson as "global localization" or "glocalization." What is taking place is that worldwide processes are being adapted to *local* circumstances, and so globalization may be a self-limiting process insofar as it incorporates locality. Many of the forces that appear to be homogenizing the global market involve subtle, but important cultural differences, and so what is actually taking place is the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism.[10]

If religious traditions are being enhanced by globalization in this way, then it may be better to describe religious groups as a part of wider transnational religious subcultures. This notion focuses on the way religious power and knowledge are not only ideas or belief systems that are free-floating in the ether of some kind of global public sphere. They are rooted or embodied in the virtues and practices of particular religious traditions, embedded in actual faith communities in ways that bring together forms of piety and cultural and religious identity as a basis for political mobilization.[11] Therefore, if this is the case, then the Catholic social principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, social justice, and the common good *may be ways of directing global localization in ways that promote authentic human development*. Only a few of these ways are briefly examined later on in this paper later.

The changing nature of international conflict and security is the third important sign of the times since the Second Vatican Council. The Council and much of the post-conciliar social teaching dealt with the social and ethical aspects of nuclear weapons, the East-West axis, and the North-South axis of world division. Since the Second World War there has been a decline in wars between states, which *may have made states more secure, but it has made people more insecure*. Brutal wars within states - civil wars, guerrilla wars, anti-colonial wars, wars of national liberation, and revolutionary uprisings characterized the 1960s and 1970s, the heady times of Vatican II and post-conciliar Catholic social teaching. What Fred Halliday has called "the Second Cold War," the end of communism, and the end of the Cold War characterized the times of John Paul II's social teaching.

Now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, new kinds of wars, internal conflicts, exacerbated by the effects of globalization, involving entire ethnic, national, or religious communities, coupled with a number of global threats - crime, and trafficking in drugs, women, children, small arms, and "conflict commodities," such as oil, timber, and diamonds, are making people more insecure than ever before.[12] What Samuel Huntington once called "decaying states" in the 1960s, are now called since the 1990s "weak" or "failed states," caught in a spiral of poverty, instability, and conflict. They are susceptible to religious extremism or Islamic terrorist groups, and exacerbate the existing tensions between the ethnic and religious groups and communities they contain.[13]

Thus, it is imperative that we begin to take religious and cultural pluralism seriously; promoting inter-religious dialogue, which the Second Vatican Council saw as an important part of the Church's global mission (NA), has become a vital part of Western foreign policy and peacemaking to support nation-building, international security, and international development. Given these changing signs of the times we can now consider how Alasdair MacIntyre's social theory can help the Church take more seriously the impact of cultural and religious pluralism, and the global resurgence of religion in international development policy.

Alasdair MacIntyre's Social Theory: Recovering the Theopolitics of Catholic Social Teaching

Few contemporary social theorists have taken other religious, cultural, and social traditions as seriously as Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, rationality is not independent of social and historical context, or of any specific understanding of human nature. Values and ethical conceptions such as what is good, what is just, as well as notions of obligation and the

rationality on which they are based, are embodied in particular social traditions and communities. There is no rationality independent of tradition, no "view from nowhere," no set of rules or principles which will commend themselves to all people, independent of their conception of the good.[14]

MacIntyre's social theory contributes to a fundamentally new understanding of religion in theology, religious studies, and the social sciences. Following MacIntyre, "post-liberal" theologians - Hans Fei, George Lindbeck, etc., have rejected what they call the "cognitive-propositional" approach to religion. Religion is neither a body of ideas, a belief system, or an ideology, as political scientists would put it; nor is religion what Max Weber would call a "social ethic," in which the ethics of the religion can be separated from doctrine or theology. Religion is also not what Clifford Geertz has called a "cultural system," i.e. a set of symbols which locates religion inside the person by establishing certain moods, motivations, conceptions as styles of religiosity. Each of these definitions is part of the "invention of religion" by Western modernity.[15]

Instead, MacIntyre holds that religion should be interpreted as a type of social tradition—a historically extended, constantly evolving debate about the nature of the good in a particular society. They are embodied in, and therefore cannot be separated from, a specific social and cultural context, a view that is increasingly accepted by many scholars of religion.[16]

Post-liberals have called this the "cultural-linguistic" approach to religion. What is important about this approach for scholars and practitioners of international development is that it emphasizes that content matters - religious experience and linguistic formulation can not be separated. It recognizes the historical and mediating role of culture in all human thought and experience - so it is communitarian, and it is historicist, in so far as it insists on the importance of cultural and religious traditions in historic faith communities. It is these faith communities that make up the real existing communities in the developing world.

What Weber, Geertz, and others miss is the fact that virtues and moral judgements in "religion" are not declaratory ideas, norms, values, principles, or moral statements to which rational (autonomous) individuals simply decide to give their intellectual assent (i.e. the "cognitive-propositional" approach to religion). What moral judgments mean in any community is shaped by its linguistic conventions, and is inextricably connected to the practices of its religious tradition. Morals are only intelligible as types of behavior (social practices) passed on through the narratives that shape the identity of the community.

Therefore, MacIntyre's social theory contributes to a richer, narrative conception of human identity. It recognizes how religious traditions shape identity, thought, and experience around the world. Later on we will see how this approach to religion is helpful for understanding identity in developing countries, and this is what makes the concept of "Christian personalism" in Catholic social teaching so relevant to developing countries as a part of the Church's approach to authentic human development.

Now, this is not a new perspective, for it is how the early Church understood the moral life. Character and community developed together as part of the moral ecology of the early Church. "The moral life [was] part of the life of faith, of life within the Church, and of one's earthly pilgrimage," it was not, as liberal modernity or today's theorists of cosmopolitan ethics would have it, for example, Brian Berry, David Held, and Andrew Linklater, about

following "the dictates of natural reason nor allegiance to a set of self-evident autonomous moral principles."[17] For the New Testament and the early church, morality - the moral life, is determined within the life of faith as a response to God's grace. This is what *Veritatis Splendor*, and the new *Catechism of the Catholic Church* have re-emphasized as part of John Paul II's recovery of the Church's moral teaching (VS, 10-11). Thus, it is this aspect of early Christian life that is being retrieved in the aftermath of MacIntyre' social theory by the modern virtue-ethics tradition, and by communitarian approaches to theology. However, rather oddly, given the "communitarian" aspects of developing societies, these are the aspects that have been underplayed in some interpretations of Catholic social teaching on international development.[18]

MacIntyre's definition is crucial for how religion should be understood in international development. Most Western governments and development agencies have adopted what Yale University law professor Stephen L. Carter calls a "culture of disbelief" in public debates about social policy, and his general argument can be extended to foreign aid policy as well.[19] They have argued that "religion" gets in the way of helping the poor or promoting development. It is all right, following Weber, for religion to provide the "motives," "inner factors," or "the practical impulses"—love, charity, compassion, and a sense of justice or obligation—for faith-based NGOs to participate in relief and development, but it should not interfere in the *content* of development—that is, it should not influence what is effectively a secular development agenda, with its own understandings of what constitutes rationality, progress, social justice, and modern economic development. Unfortunately, many people, and it would appear many Catholics included - in almost the same way that John Kerry talked about religion and politics in the presidential election in 2004, have argued in this way.

In other words, CAFOD in Britain or the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the United States should be little more than Oxfam - with hymns, and the churches little more than a lobby group for the foreign aid industry, or a useful infrastructure for the World Bank to implement the Millennium Development Goals. If Catholic social teaching, and the "social teaching" of the main world religions, is really little more than what the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) seems to say they are, "common values in different disguises," why bother with the disguises? Why bother with the *content* of Catholic social teaching (in contrast to its laudable *motives* for social action), or the role of culture and religion in international development at all?[20]

Now, the view of the ICRC is a common enough one, but what it really shows up for Catholic aid agencies, as well as for any type of faith-based development agency, is the fundamental crisis in theological ethics or the social ethics of the main world religions that informs how they engage with policy on international development. Ever since Kant theologians have tried to show the overlap between secular ethics and Christian ethics so ethical principles - the motives, for example, for foreign aid or development, can be accessed by people outside the Christian community - "all people of good will," as Pope John XXIII famously put it for the first time.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, for example, has argued that religious leaders and institutions, as a part of civil society, can support preventative action to avert deadly conflicts. They can do this by promoting "norms for tolerance to guide their faithful," referring to the "global ethic" drawn up by Hans Kung's Global Ethics Foundation,

and they can support a "culture of prevention" through a type of religious education that encourages social tolerance and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It criticizes religious education as an often narrow focus on "indoctrination in the history and theology of the faith;" and, certainly, we have seen this to be the case in many poor Islamic countries, but it is also the case in Saudi Arabia, and many Europeans would add, the United States as well. However, the Carnegie Commission's solution is simply to say that the "ethical content" of religion should be expanded, as if to argue, social ethics can be separated from theology - so, who needs the theology anyway?[21] How nice it is of Western governments, research institutes, and aid agencies to find something useful for churches and faith-based organizations to do.

We have already seen some of the dangers for people of faith - indeed, *all* people of faith, and not just Catholics or other Christians, when this kind of approach to international relations or development policy is adopted. This approach allows people of faith, for example, to oppose the war in Iraq, support foreign aid, or even a variety of worthy social improvements in their own countries, such as the way the British churches supported the Beveridge Report for the creation of the Welfare State in the post-war era, without implying their support was based on any kind of principles rooted in religion or theology. In this way, as Fergusson has argued, British churches felt they could make a constructive moral contribution to a religiously pluralistic society.

The danger of this kind of strategy for development policy is that it is based on a tacit acceptance of the basic structures of Western society - secularism and liberal modernity, and so it can inhibit the church's prophetic role to confront and challenge society. If the ethical motives or principles rooted in Christian theology can be presented as separate from their theological foundations - such as with some of the older interpretations of the natural law tradition, then Christian beliefs and doctrines can seem marginal, redundant, and even unnecessary, just as the ICRC or the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict have indicated, and further examples could be drawn from the UN's approach to religious traditions in its otherwise useful Commission on Human Security.[22]

What MacIntyre's social theory makes clear, which most development practitioners do not even grapple with, is that debates over development policy are taking place within the crisis of Western liberalism - the fragmenting of societies, with people increasingly separated from their moral traditions, institutions, and communities.[23] However, the purpose of development policy - as the social teaching of John Paul II indicates, with its criticism of Marxism, collectivism, *and* liberal capitalism, is not to promote the kind of develop in poor countries that contributes to their societies falling apart like ours in the West (SS, CA). Doesn't the Catholic Church, with its global vision, and concept of integral or authentic human development have something more to offer the world? In the first century of a new global era that is post-secular as well as postmodern, Catholic social teaching may be another way to barrow Ivan Illich's phrase, for people of faith in developing countries "outwitting the 'developed' countries."[24]

We can now see more clearly in our postmodern era the extent to which the conventional approach to foreign aid and development policy is rooted in Western concepts of liberal modernity. The religious missionaries of faith-based organizations and the secular missionaries of the development NGOs are both proselytizing, each according to their understanding of modernity and development. Secular missionaries have reduced the "thick"

social practices embedded in the traditions of the main world religions and communities into "thin" practices: abstract moral rules, norms, or values, which can only be appealed to by a "rationality" detached from religion, culture, and tradition. In other words, the secular missionaries of the development NGOs have turned what MacIntyre would call a practice-based morality, or a Christian morality rooted in the "thick" virtues and social practices of ecclesial life, into a rule-based or principle-based approach to the ethical dilemmas in development.[25]

The problem is that this approach to foreign policy, development policy, and international ethics misunderstands the moral predicaments of the developing world. If MacIntyre is right about the tradition-dependent nature of rationality, then morality is not detached from the traditions and communities through which most people in the world live out their moral and social lives. As Jean Bethke Elshtain has noted, "the vast majority of people in the world surely do not think of themselves as subjects of international duties and rights." They experience the moral life, and understand the meaning of well-being, development, social tolerance, or non-violent conflict resolution, within the context of the virtues, social practices, and traditions of their communities, including their religious traditions. These are the real existing communities in international development.[26]

In a world of growing cultural and religious diversity what does this understanding of religion mean for Catholic social teaching on international development? Firstly, Catholic social teaching has been overly concerned with its appeal to "modern man" - meaning modern secular man, and to "all men of good will;" but given the global resurgence of religion, the more relevant appeal today is a less Euro-centric one. It is directed to other faith communities, not to Harvey Cox's "secular city" - New York, Paris, London, or Berlin; but, to the faithful city - Lagos, Nairobi, Seoul, Manila, and Jakarta, as Cox has now acknowledged in his study of global Pentecostalism.[27]

Secondly, what MacIntyre's social theory helps us to recover is the fact that Catholic social teaching regarding social questions, on foreign aid, and international development policy is part of the larger corpus of Catholic theology, and is as an integral part of the Church's teaching (MM, 150-177). Even Pope John XXIII - the secular world's most popular pontiff, insists the reconstructing of social relationships in truth, justice, and love can not be separate from theology. He says quite clearly, the "social teaching proclaimed by the Catholic Church cannot be separated from her traditional teaching regarding man's life" (MM, 222).[28]

The Church is the mother and teacher of the nations so that all may find salvation, as well as the fullness of life, for the teaching of Christ embraces the whole person in the whole world – soul, body, intellect, and will (MM, 1-3). This is the theological foundation of the Church's concept of integral or authentic human development, and it is an inherent part of the Church's theology, as well as its evangelistic mission to spread the gospel to all nations (RM); and, arguably, it is not the same thing as holistic, secular, approaches to social development rooted in liberal modernity. Therefore, the concept of integral human development in Catholic social teaching can not be separated from its theological foundations.

Clearly, the Church's concept of integral human development needs to be more directly related to the changing discourse on a more holistic meaning of development, and the way

considerations of culture and religion are coming in to the discourse and practice of aid agencies.[29] Briefly, it is now more widely recognized that successful development, no matter how it is defined, can only occur if social and economic change correspond with the moral basis of society. This view has sought to connect religious values both to the actual *kind* of development that takes place, and to the *meaning* of development.[30]

When development does not correspond with a society's moral base, and a country makes a choice for development over authenticity, like the Shah's Iran, Poland, or the Philippines, and promotes a distorted form of modernity and development, this can not only lead to policy failure, but also to political instability, or revolution, but today we would add religious terrorism, and genocide and ethnic civil war, in places like Bosnia, Rwanda, the Sudan, and Sri Lanka.[31]

Authenticity and Development:
MacIntyre's social theory and authentic human development

In our postmodern era the Catholic Church's concept of integral or authentic human development can help the Church respond more effectively to the struggles for authenticity and development taking place throughout the developing world as part of the global resurgence of religion. This section will examine what MacIntyre's social theory means for three aspects of international development policy: (i) Christian personalism - rethinking, religion, civil society, and development, (ii) subsidiarity, and the role of faith-based organizations, and (iii) global justice and the common good in a world of cultural diversity.

(1)
Christian Personalism:
rethinking, religion, civil society, and development

The concept of Christian personalism can be interpreted within MacIntyre's narrative conception of identity since both conceptions share a relational understanding of identity, rather than a notion of identity rooted in the rational autonomy of the individual in liberal modernity. This has crucial implications for how Catholic aid agencies, other faith-based NGOs, as well as secular development NGOs, understand how religion and civil society are related to democracy and development.

After a decade of civil society programs adopted by Western donor governments to promote democracy and development what we now know is that the modern form of civil society is unrecognizable in most parts of the developing world. The reason for this is that a new kind of identity as well as new forms of social and political organization is required for the modern concept of civil society.

What the foreign aid and development literature has not emphasized is that the modern concept of civil society going back to the Scottish Enlightenment altered the concept of identity on which civil society was based.[32] It was David Hume and Adam Ferguson who helped transform both the concept of the individual and the concept of civil society. They did this, as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor have explained, by rejecting the Aristotelian conception of morality, with its concept of the *telos*, or ultimate governing principles that guide the moral life, and posited the notion of autonomous individuals

motivated by moral sentiments - passions, emotions, and desires. Civil society simply became the arena in which each person pursues their own idea of the good life in a utilitarian way.[33]

It is Ernst Gellner who has emphasized more strongly than most scholars that a new kind of person, with a new kind of human identity, accompanied the development of civil society in the eighteenth century. Gellner calls new kind of person, "modular man," with a bolted-on identity, unencumbered by ethnicity, religion, or other kinds of affective ties, which is embedded in a new kind of culture, the culture of liberal democracy and capitalist modernity.[34] The modern concept of civil society is part of a self-congratulatory form of political liberalism. John Hall argues it is one of the unique accomplishments of the West.[35] Many people consider Habermas' celebrated theory of the public sphere to reflect at its best this concept of civil society.[36]

Therefore, the modern concept of civil society is inevitably a normative concept as well as an analytical one, and this is something which the Church can recognize given its concept of authentic human development. The idea of building civil society in developing countries has to be seen as part of the wider debates over modernization and Westernization. Civil society can not be examined as a value-free, mechanistic, or technical way for Western donor governments and aid agencies to promote freedom, democracy, development, or conflict prevention. The debate over building civil society is part of the struggle over church and state or mosque and state in developing countries, it is part of the struggle over the boundaries of the sacred and the profane, and the battles over authenticity and development taking place throughout the developing world.

In fact, the modern form of civil society is unrecognizable in most parts of the developing world. Religious beliefs and the ascriptive aspects of clan, ethnic, or religion remain a part of the "modernization of tradition" in developing countries.[37] Contrary to modernization theory, the intermingling of ethnic groups and professions in urban life is not leading to the bolted-on, individualized, social conditioning required for the modern kind of civil society Hall, Gellner, and Habermas have celebrated. Quite the opposite has occurred with the rise of identity politics, the resurgence of these ethnic, religious, or regional forms of identity.

> "Africans do not conceive of themselves as discrete individuals in the Western mould...Individuals are not perceived as being meaningfully and instrumentally separate from the (various) communities to which they belong. This means that individuals remain firmly placed within the family, kin, and communal networks which (s)he is issued...Africans do not now appear to feel that their 'being modern' requires them to be single individuals whose life choices are essentially determined by their own private circumstances and desires. Difficult as it may be for us to conceive of modernity other than in our own terms, it is necessary to understand how Africans can be both modern and 'non-individual(ist)' if we are to make sense of political events on the continent."[38]

We can see more clearly why, as MacIntyre has argued, his narrative conception of the self, and his concepts of the virtues, and social practices out of which his understanding of morality, social tradition, and community emerges, may very well be consistent with the intuitive understanding of morality and social practices still found in most parts of the developing world.[39] MacIntyre, it will be recalled, argues our values and ethical conceptions and the rationality on which they are based, are socially embodied in particular social traditions and communities. There is no rationality independent of tradition, no set of moral

principles or guidelines which will commend themselves to all independent of their conception of the good.

The Church has a deeper, more coherent account of these human relationships with it understanding of Christian personalism, the human person and society (in contrast to the "individualism" in liberal modernity), and MacIntyre's relational, narrative understanding of identity helps us to see more clearly why this is the case. The self in this account is a self with a life story, embedded in the story of a larger community. Character is displayed and developed when individuals are inducted into particular communities, which are them selves shaped by larger narratives and social traditions. This continues to be the case in Africa, but the same thing can be said about other parts of the developing world, and even of Japan and East Asia.[40]

If rationality is dependent on tradition, then morality is not detached from historical communities and cultural and religious traditions. Contrary to Weber, what is important are not only the religiously-based values or motives for social change and community development, but the kind of moral reasoning that gives rise to the content of those convictions and the faith communities in which they are embedded.

Appeals to the virtues and moral judgements in religion, or to duty, charity, justice, compassion, obligation, and tolerance - the appeals to conscience, John Paul II has mentioned (SS, 4), are not free-floating moral propositions to which rational (autonomous) individuals simply give their intellectual assent. What they mean is shaped by the linguistic conventions of different faith communities, connected to the practices of a religious tradition, and are only intelligible because they are recognized types of behavior (social practices) passed on through the narratives that shape the identity of these communities.

Therefore, for MacIntyre, as for Catholic moral and social teaching, the actions of human persons can not be isolated from each other, for every act in an act of the whole person. The question is not, "What am I to do?" in a particular situation, for this is the kind of single questions framed in what is called "quandary ethics," which emerges from the moral predicament of the rational and autonomous individual in secular modernity and political liberalism.[41] At issue for faith communities is a more primary question, one that is identified with MacIntyre's narrative understanding of human identity: "Of which stories am I a part?," for as David Burrell has argued regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are "narratives competing for our souls," but the same could be said for the ethical dilemmas in development or the conflicts in developing countries.[42]

The vast majority of people in the world, as the Catholic Church, and even the World Bank now acknowledge, do not interpret and live out their moral and social lives according to the rationality and autonomy of liberal modernity. They still experience the moral life, however imperfectly it is lived out, as MacIntyre has indicated, and in ways that resemble the Catholic principle of Christian personalism, within the virtues, practices, and social traditions that are a part of their faith communities.

What we can now see is that the modern virtue-ethics tradition in the aftermath of MacIntyre's social theory allows for the crucial role of churches, mosques, temples, and other places of worship in building what Stanley Hauerwas has called "communities of character" as a part of foreign aid policy. The virtue-ethics approach argues that the primary

task of religious social ethics is not to come up with policies to promote justice, peace, or social change and development. When religious social ethics defines its task in this way the churches, mosques, or temples that make up faith communities in developing countries can easily be marginalized or forgotten, or they simply become another part of civil society, democratic pluralism, and part of a secular, a Western development agenda, as we have seen in the ICRC's view of ethics and development or the Carnegie Commission's view of religion and deadly conflict. Faith seems to be of secondary importance to the "real" and more general goal of promoting social change, a more just society, preventing deadly conflict, or meeting the World Bank's Millennium Development Goals.

However, virtue-ethics, and Christian personalism's narrative concept of identity emphasize that the *truthfulness* of religious convictions cannot be separated from the *kind of community* that the church, the mosque, or temple is, or is trying to become. Liberal notions of freedom, social justice, or peace are not free-standing values which any one of good will can simply give their intellectual assent. How they are interpreted is part of how the virtues and practices of a religious tradition are enacted, embodied, and disseminated by a particular faith community.[43]

Theology and social ethics can not be separated as liberal modernity would have it. The "good," therefore, of the Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist religious tradition, is the *formation of a particular kind of community*, one that inculcates those virtues and practices necessary for what it means to authentically live out life according to Catholic social teaching or according to the social teaching of any other religious tradition. We have already seen that this is how John Paul II's recovery of moral theology, and the new *Catechism of the Catholic Church* situate the Church's *social* teaching - within a moral framework examining what it means to live out life in Christ.

Such a community, contrary to our liberal presuppositions, does not have to be characterized by an oppressive uniformity. The mark of a truthful community is partly seen in its dialogue about what are the primary "goods" of its religious tradition, and it is seen in how it enables the diversity of gifts and virtues within it to flourish, for such a community of character is, as Hauerwas amusingly says, is also "a community of characters," and there are enough of those in the Catholic Church.[44] Now, there is nothing to indicate building a community of character is easy. The issues faith communities must deal with in the developing world are complex, and include gender and reproductive issues, HIV/AIDS, religious approaches to work, wealth, and poverty, usury and interest, corruption, state privatization, inter-faith cooperation, and good governance.

Clearly, what is distinctive about a virtue-ethics approach to aid policy is the place it allows for role of churches, mosques, temples, and other places of worship to participate in these aspects of development policy. This is not the same thing as aid agencies simply working with and through local churches, mosques, or temples, which is already happening since the shift in aid policy in the 1980s to channel funds through NGOs rather than corrupt governments as part of the privatization of foreign aid. Virtue-ethics and building communities of character, as we will see below, represents a fundamentally different way of working with places of worship in developing countries, and one which can help local Catholic communities to live out the Church's social teaching. It is also particularly important since the foreign aid industry has now recognized the key role faith-based organizations can play in reaching the poor and alleviating world poverty.

Subsidiarity, Faith-based Organizations, and International Development Policy

According to the principle of subsidiarity "a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions." Rather, it "should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, but always with a view to the common good."[45] The common good is defined as "the sum total of social conditions which enable individuals, families, and organizations to achieve their own fulfillment more fully and easily."[46] Therefore, all power in the Christian community should be exercised at the lowest level compatible with the common good, which is ordered to the end of persons and organizations that make up civil society. The role of the state is to promote the common good of civil society (Catechism, 1910).

Mater et Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress) recognized - in contrast to the mainstream experts on development in the 1960s, cultural matters should not be ignored amidst the concern for social change and development. People in developing countries, given the principle of subsidiarity, should "feel themselves to be the ones chiefly responsible for their own progress," and development experts should "favor and help private enterprises in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity in order to allow private citizens themselves to accomplish as much as is feasible" (MM, 152, 159; 82, 53; PT, 140).

Forty years later, we can see better how the principle of subsidiarity can help to maintain the kind of balance in development policies between the state and civil society, which the World Bank and Western donor governments have not been very good at, with their emphasis on civil society and privatization, and only belatedly recognizing the positive role of the state.[47] These ideas are now mainstream, expressed in the current jargon or development discourse as the need for people in developing countries to feel "ownership" over their development programs, the need for "participatory development," micro-finance programs, and the support for civil society rather than state-led development (MM, 22, 152, 259).

However, given the global resurgence of religion, these Catholic social principles can be extended to the way power is exercised in other faith communities as well. One of the events that prompted the World Bank's interest in developing a dialogue and partnership with faith-based organizations was the discovery by its research program, "Voices of the Poor," that religious leaders and institutions were often the most trusted people and institutions in developing countries, given their own corrupt governments and public sector welfare services.[48] The World Bank and development NGOs have come to recognize that poor communities can also be described as faith communities. It turns out religion—its beliefs, rituals, practices, and institutions—is still central to the social, cultural, and moral life of these communities.[49] Indeed, as this paper has argued, they constitute the real existing communities in international development.

What can be called the new orthodoxy regarding religion and development was stated by Kumi Naidoo, the general secretary of CIVICUS, a global alliance of NGOs committed to strengthening civil action and civil society. In a study on charitable giving in Islam, Naidoo noted what turns out to be the practical result when the principle of subsidiarity is applied to

foreign aid policy, regarding efficiency and transparency. "[F]aith-based organizations probably provide the best social and physical infrastructure in the poorest communities," he says, "[because] churches, temples, mosques, and other places of worship [are] focal points for the communities they serve."[50]

Thus, the principle of subsidiarity can be more directly related to the growing recognition by the World Bank, Western donor governments, and development NGOs that faith-based organizations can play a vital role in the delivery of social services, alleviating world poverty, and meeting the Millennium Development Goals.[51] However, for Catholic faith-based organizations the virtue-ethics perspective can help local churches and communities to see that there role in social service delivery is not only an instrumental one, but is part of their grappling with what it means for their churches to become the kind of communities of character that display those virtues and practices necessary for authentic human development.[52]

(3)
Global Justice, the Common Good, and International Development Policy in a World of Cultural Diversity

Catholic social teaching is about the integral or authentic development of *persons*, or rather persons-in-communities, or persons and peoples, rather than about the economic development of the multiplicity of national states that make up international society (Catechism, 1905-1912). What does this actually mean, for it sound more like a radical sound bite than a statement of practical policy? How *can* the Church formulate its commitment to global justice and the common good in a world of growing cultural and religious diversity? After all, John Rawls and other political liberals argue that the pluralism of international society means such a project indebted to Aristotle, Aquinas, and Catholic social teaching has to be abandoned?[53]

The Church's concept of authentic human development can not be separated from its understanding of global justice and the common good. The Church acknowledges the North-South gap, the need for foreign aid, and the need "to reform international economic and financial institutions so that they will better promote equitable relationships" with developing countries - which, can be supported by all people of good will; but, it also argues for authenticity and development. Holistic development "reduces dire poverty and economic exploitation," but it also "makes for growth in respect for cultural identities and openness to the transcendent" (Catechism, 2437-2441; SRS, 16, 32; CA, 26, 51).

The Church's concept of authentic human development is about promoting authentic social change and development. Catholic social teaching can help churches, temples, and mosques to build the kind of communities of character that generate the social capital - the ideas, and trust linking groups and individuals, important for democracy and development. What this is about is changing the political culture of societies and local communities. Crucially, as the Human Development Report on cultural liberty argues, this is what needs to be done to promote freedom, and the protection of minorities as well. Changes in policy, legislation, and constitutional provisions are all important it says, but changing political culture is what allows real change to happen, which is what promotes tolerance and cultural diversity as part of the foundations of democracy.[54]

The Report says in the Foreword, when this does not happen, "the consequences are disturbingly clear." It is now more widely recognized that successful development, no matter how it is defined, can only occur if social and economic change correspond with the moral basis of society. This view has sought to connect religious values both to the actual kind of development that takes place, and to the meaning of development. We have seen that when development does not correspond with a society's moral base, and a country makes a cruel choice between bread and dignity, for development over authenticity, and promotes a distorted form of modernity and development, this can not only lead to policy failure, but also to political instability, revolution, terrorism, and religious extremism.

It is for this reason, inter-religious dialogue, and the Church's vision of how faith, culture, and religion are related have vital implications for the debate over conflict, security, and development. The principles of subsidiarity and the common good fit together. The common good is ordered to the end of the persons and communities that make up the state and civil society, and global justice is the ordering of goods is domestic society and international society in such a way that they contribute to the authentic development of persons and communities.[55]

Thus, MacIntyre's social theory and the Church's social teaching can help faith-based development NGOs and the foreign aid policy of Western donor governments to take inter-religious dialogue, and cultural and religious pluralism seriously in international development. The principle of subsidiarity can help the Church to recognize what I have called the "deeper pluralism" among the different associations or communities that make up civil society in developing countries. This pluralism includes the "thick" practices—the virtues, social practices, and traditions—of the main world religions.

What is being argued here is contrary to Kantian ethics or cosmopolitanism in international ethics.[56] This does mean there are no universal moral values, only that Enlightenment rationality or the rationality of the Western Enlightenment is not the only way of arriving at them. Conceptions of the common good are embedded in different cultural and religious traditions. The task for Catholic aid agencies, and other faith-based agencies, given the principle of subsidiarity, is to identify those common, "thick" social practices regarding the moral life, and the virtues necessary to sustain them, found at the community level in other religious traditions, such as charity (*zakat* in Islam), hospitality, etc. This can provide a way for the members of faith-based organizations in different religious traditions to work together to implement the common good in their community.[57] In this way the principle of subsidiarity also helps the Church and Catholic aid agencies implement its "option for the poor," and to do so in ways that promote authentic human development because it is promoting a type of development that is consistent with the moral base of these communities.

In other words, what can be called a "rooted cosmopolitanism" is based on the common, thick social practices in different religious traditions, rather than appeals to the universal rationality of the Western Enlightenment.[58] This is the only place where a genuine dialogue between civilizations can occur, but as this dialogue takes place so does the dialogue *within* religious traditions. Virtue-ethics, the approach to ethics that has emerged in the aftermath of MacIntyre's social theory, shows how this can be done. In this sense, a virtue-ethics approach to foreign aid policy is akin to what is now called "faith-based diplomacy," a

mode of diplomacy in which an active religious faith is a vital part of diplomacy and peacebuilding.[59]

[1] John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What It Means To Be Modern* (London: Faber & Faber, 2003).

[2] Scott M. Thomas, "'The Revenge of God?': The Twentieth Century as the 'Last Modern Century,'" in Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York & London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 21-46.

[3] Christoph Bertram, "Naming a New Era: the Interregnum," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 2000); David Tracy, *On Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics, and Church* (New York: Orbis, 2000).

[4] "Jesus Christ the Bearer of the Water of Life, A Christian Reflection on the 'New Age,'" Pontifical Council for Culture, Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (London: CTS, 2003); Scott M. Thomas, "Religious resurgence, postmodernism, and world politics," in John L. Esposito and Michael Watson (eds.), *Religion and glob al order* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 38-65.

[5] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); David Westerlund (ed.), *Questioning the Secular State: The Widespread Resurgence of Religion in Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

[6] Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York & London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2003).

[7] *Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, Human Development Report 2004 (New York: UNDP, 2004).

[8] Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

[9] Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (Sage, 1994), Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, 1996), Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: international relations in the twentieth century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,, 1997).

[10] Roland Robertson, "Globalization and the Future of 'Traditional Religion'," in Max L. Stackhouse, Peter J. Paris (eds.), *Religion and the Powers of the Common Life*, God *and* Globalization, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 2000), 53-68.

[11] Scott M. Thomas, "The Soul of the World? Religious Non-State Actors in World Politics," in S.M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*, Chapter 4, 97-120.

[12] *Freedom from Fear: Canada's foreign policy for human security* (Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002); *Human Security Now*, Commission on Human Security (New York: United Nations, 2003).

[13] *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security*, Commission on Weak States and U. S. National Security (Washington, D.C. 2004).

[14] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2d ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985) and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality*? (London: Duckworth, 1988).

[15] Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in H.H. Girth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 267-301; Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 87-125.

[16] Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

[17] David Fergusson, *Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9-21, esp. p. 21.

[18] Paul Vallely (ed*.), The New Politics: Catholic Social Teaching for the Twenty-First Century* (London: SCM, 1998); Ian Linden, *A New Map of the World* (London: Darton, Longman, Todd, 2003).

[19] Stephen L. Carter, *The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

[20] *World Disasters Report*, Focus on ethics in aid (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2003).

[21] *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*, Final Report with Executive Summary (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), 114-118, 153.

[22] *Human Security Now*, Commission on Human Security (New York: United Nations, 2003).

[23] Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Democracy on Trial* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

[24] Ivan Illich, "Outwitting the 'Developed' Countries." in Charles K. Wilber (ed.), *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: Random House, 1973), 401-409.

[25] It is this kind of critical engagement that is missing from Edward A. Violett's excellent study of Catholic social teaching and "secular" approaches to social development. Edward A. Violett, *Faith Based Development: The Social Development Perspectives in Catholic Social Teaching, with an illustrative case study of the Ranchi, Archdiocese, India* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 2003).

[26] Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Really Existing Communities," *Review of International Studies* 25, 1 (1999): 141-46.

[27] Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Christianity and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1995).

[28] Stanley Hauerwas and Jana Bennett argue for the theopolitical primacy of the encyclicals, and why their moral and social teaching can not be separated. "'A Recall to Christian Life': What is Social about the Catholic Social Teaching" (unpublished MSS,

the author would like to thank Stanley Hauerwas for making this paper available to him). My paper agrees with this way of interpreting Catholic social teaching and draws the implications of this position out for international development policy.

[29] Scott M. Thomas, "Faith and Foreign Aid, or How the World Bank Got Religion," *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 2, 2 (2004): 21-30; Scott M. Thomas, "Where Faith and Economics Meet? Rethinking Religion, Civil Society, and International Development," in S. M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*, Chapter 9, 219-246.

[30] Charles K. Wilber and Kenneth P. Jameson, "Religious Values and the Social Limits to Development," *World Development*, 8, 7/8 (1980): 467-479; Thierry G. Verhelst, *No Life Without Roots: Culture and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1990); B. Haverkort, K. van't Hooft, and W. Hiemstra (eds.), *Ancient Roots, New Shoots: Endogenous Development in Practice* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2003);

[31] Manning Nash, Islam in Iran: Turmoil, Transformation or Transcendence?," *World Development*, 8, 7/8 (1980): 555-561.

[32] June Howell and Jenny Pearce, "Civil Society, the State, and the Market: A Triadic Development Model for the Twenty First Century?, " in Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce , *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 63-88 .

[33] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: a study in moral theory* (London: Duckworth, 1985); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: the making of the modern identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[34] Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994)

[35] John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," in John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995),1-31.

[36] Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

[37] L. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[38] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascol Daloz, *Africa Works: disorder as political instrument* (London: James Currey, 1999), 52-53.

[39] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?, Which Rationality* (London: Duckworth, 1996), 354-55.

[40] Joanne Baldine, "Is Human Identity an Artifact?: How Some Conceptions of the Asian and Western Self Fare During Technological and Legal Development," *Phil & Tech*, 3, 2 (1997): 25-36.

[41] Edmund Pincoffs, "Quandary Ethics," in Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), *Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 92-112.

[42] David B. Burrell, "Narratives Competing for Our Souls," in James P. Sterba (ed.), *Terrorism and International Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 88-100.

[43] This is the main problem that Edward A. Violett ignores in his attempt to find elements of congruence between Catholic social teaching the notion of social development in development discourse. He has not critically examined theologically the concepts of social development. Edward A. Violett, *Faith Based Development: The Social Development Perspectives in Catholic Social Teaching* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 2003).

[44] Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: toward a constructive Christian social ethic* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1981); Stanley Hauerwas, *After Christendom? How the church is to behave if freedom, justice, and a Christian nation are bad ideas* (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1991).

[45] CA, 48; *Catechism* 1883-1885.

[46] GS, 26, 74; *Catechism*, 1877-1948.

[47] *The State in a Changing World*, World Bank Development Report 1997 (Washington, D.C. World Bank, 1997).

[48] Deepa Narayan, *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank, 2000).

[49] Deryke Belshaw, Robert Calderisi, and Chris Sugden (eds*.), Faith in Development: Possibilities for Partnership between the World Bank and the Churches in Africa* (Oxford: Regnum Books/Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, 2001).

[50] Kumi Naidoo, The Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), *Alliance*, 5, 1 (2000).

[51] Katherine Marshall and Richard Marsh (ed*.), Millennium Challenges for Development and Faith Institutions* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003); Katherine Marshall and Lucy Keough (eds*.), Mind, Heart, and Soul in the Fight Against Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004).

[52] Now, whether the World Banks sees faith-based organizations simply as a "means" to achieve the Bank's own goals - the Millennium Development Goals, or as part of larger "ends," based on a more holistic concept of development, is one of the questions examined in a path-breaking Ph.D. dissertation by John Rees, "The Agency of Religious Concepts in the Development Ideology of the World Bank," School of Politics and International Relations, University of New South Wales, Australia.

[53] David Hollenbach, *The Common Good & Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[54] *Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, Human Development Report 2004 (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2004). On what *can* be done at the international level see, Bruce Cronin, *Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[55] On a more general discussion of the Catholic social principles of justice, subsidiarity, and the common good see Hollenbach, "The global common good," in Hollenbach, *The Common Good & Christian Ethics*, 212-244.

[56] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[57] I have given specific examples of this with the Family Planning Association of Bangladesh, the Women's Welfare Association in Indonesia, the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka, and the Sarkan Zoumountsi Association in the Cameroon, Scott M. Thomas, "Building Communities of Character: U.S. Foreign Aid Policy and Faith-based Organizations,' *SAIS Review* (School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University), 24, 2 (2004): 133-148.

[58] Hollenbach traces this term to Kwame Anthony Appiah in *The Common Good & Christian Ethics*, 221-222. I have picked up the term, and adapted it, using MacIntyre's narrative theory, from Mitchell Cohn, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism," in Nicholaus Mills (ed.), *Legacy of Dissent: 40 Years of Writing from Dissent Magazine* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1994), 131-140.
[59] Douglas Johnston (ed.), *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

List of Cited Papal Encyclicals

CA   *Centesimus Annus*, On the Hundredth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*,   1991.

GS   *Gaudium et Spes*, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, 1965.

LG   *Lumen Gentium*, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 1964.

MM   *Mater et Magistra*, Christianity and Social Progress, 1961.

NA   *Nostra aetate*, Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, 1965.

PP   *Populorum Progressio*, On the Development of Peoples, 1967.

PT   *Pacem in Terris*, Peace on Earth, 1963.

EN   *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, Evangelization in the Modern World, 1975.

RH   *Redemptor Hominis*, Redeemer of Man, 1979.

RM   *Redemptoris Missio*, Encyclical Letter on the Church's Missionary Mandate, 1990.

SS   *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, On Social Concern, 1987.

VS   *Veritatis Splendor*, The Church's Moral Teaching, 1993.